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Introduction  
  In this paper, we examine secular trends in household savings and wealth 
accumulation in the U.S. across the last four decades.  On the savings side, the 1960s 
experienced high rates of private savings, in part providing resources for investment and 
growth.  In contrast, the 1990s were preceded by a sharp decline in private saving, starting 
in the mid-1980s and continuing to the present day.  In contrast to these declining savings 
rates, household wealth to income ratios were accelerating during the 1980s and 1990s, 
reaching an all time high at the end of the latter decade.  We argue here that rather than 
being viewed as contradictory series, declining private household savings rate are a direct 
consequence of the large capital gains households received during the stock market boom of 
the 1980s and 1990s.  The magnitude of recent price fluctuations in some key household 
assets also raises important questions about the inter-relationship between capital 
appreciation in alternative types of household assets and desired household savings.  Our 
evidence suggests that the ‘wealth effect’ on household consumption and savings varies 
significantly across different types of assets with much larger wealth effects from 
appreciation in corporate equity shares than from other types of household assets. The 
failure to differentiate wealth effects across different assets has lead to an understatement 
of the magnitude and importance of the wealth effect on household savings.   
  The organization of the paper is as follows. To set a context, section 1 describes 
aggregate measures of savings and wealth income based on Federal Reserve Flow of Funds 
accounts.  Section 2 uses micro-level household data from four decades to provide a 
description of the basic structure of wealth across households and the manner in which that 
structure has changed over time. In addition to exploring the extent to which time-series of 
household data are consistent with the aggregate series, we demonstrate that the recent 
sharp departure between private savings rates and household wealth is not primarily the 
consequence of changing demographic trends in marriage, age, and education.  The final 
section estimates micro-models of household savings that highlight the impact of capital 
gains on active savings.  When we differentiate different types of assets, our models 
indicate that the post-1983 decline in household savings can be explained by households’ 
reaction to the receipt of significant amounts of capital gains. 
 
  Section 1.1—Savings and Wealth across the Decades: Macro Measures 
  Time series trends in U.S. household savings rates and wealth to disposable   2
household income are presented for the period 1952-1998 in Fig. 1.1  While aggregate 
savings are characterized by substantial year to year volatility, our interest lies in more 
long-term movements.  As of 1960, the NIPA measure indicates a personal savings rate of 
about 7%, which rose to about 9% by the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The most dramatic 
pattern involves the most well-known: a savings rate decline from a non-recession level of 
about 9% in 1983-84 to close to zero by the end of the 1990s (Browning and Lusardi (1996)). 
  The Federal Reserve data on household balance sheets track yearly trends in 
aggregate household net worth as well as the components making up the aggregates.  
Table 1 lists total household net worth and income (expressed in 1996 dollars) obtained 
from balance sheet data.  The final columns of Table 1 list household wealth-income ratios 
that were computed by dividing yearly total net worth by total income.2  This is our best 
index of the adequacy of household wealth that can be derived from balance sheet data. 
  Based on this data, there was a 27% rise in mean household net worth from 1960 to 
1968–slightly more than income per capita growth over these years so that household 
wealth-income ratios rose somewhat.  In the six years between 1968 and 1974, however, 
wealth declined sharply (by 11%) at the same time as mean household income continued to 
rise by another 8%.  Consequently, wealth/income ratios fell by almost 20%, reaching a low 
3.8 in 1974.  While both income and wealth were expanding only slowly between 1974 and 
1983, there was a modest recovery in household wealth to income ratios (to 4.1).  Between 
1983 and 1994, household wealth and income once again grew at about the same pace—
19%—so that asset-income ratios remained constant.  Since 1994, however, household 
wealth jumped by 27% driving asset-income ratios to an all time high of 5.2 
  Table 1 demonstrates that both household income and household wealth experienced 
upward trends over time.  However, it is the non-coincident nature of these trends—or 
equivalently the asset-income series that calls for an explanation.  One explanation that 
decidedly does not fit this data involves household savings.  The fact that household wealth 
maintained pace with household income between 1983 and 1994 and grow much faster than 
income since 1994 suggests that this rising wealth trend was not the result of household 
savings behavior as the latter was cut to almost zero.  
                                                       
1 Our household savings rates are based on NIPA defined personal savings.  Alternative aggregate savings measures 
are available based either on savings from the flow of funds (FOF) or flow of funds savings to NIPA income 
definitions (FOF-NIPA).  While the two flow of funds savings rates are almost everywhere above NIPA savings 
rates, they all exhibit similar secular patterns.   
2 In contrast, Figure 1 plots household wealth relative to disposable income.   3
  A step toward understanding some reasons involves looking inside the sub-
components of aggregate household wealth.  Three important sub-components are 
highlighted in Figure 2, which plots shares of total household wealth represented by 
pension fund reserves, housing equity and the stock market (corporate equity and mutual 
funds).  The most important secular trend involves the ever rising amounts of money in 
pension fund reserves.  In 1959, these funds amounted to 453 billion (1996) dollars, 5% of 
total household wealth. By 1980, this share had doubled to 10%; then it doubled again over 
the next 11 years. Because these pension funds reserves typically do not appear as 
household assets in household surveys (including the ones used below), we re-computed 
balance sheet net worth subtracting out pension fund reserves.   
  These numbers are listed in the 2nd column of Table 1 while (net worth-pension) 
income ratios are listed in fifth column.  Given the secular patterns just described, this 
adjusted net worth series increasingly departs over time from the standard net worth 
balance sheet numbers For example, after pensions are excluded, wealth-income ratios 
declined by 8% since 1960 compared to a 14% increase in the original series.  Nonetheless, 
while this pension adjustment is important, the underlying issue still remains—a sharp 
post-1983 increase in wealth/income ratios while savings rates were plummeting.  
  The most volatile component in balance sheet accounts is stocks.  Combined 
corporate equities and mutual funds shares comprise 22% of net worth in 1959.  Fueled by 
the 1960’s stock market boom, this share peaked at 28% in 1968.  Then, equities lost almost 
a third of their real values in one-year (1969) fully explaining that year's one trillion-dollar 
decline in total household wealth.  The relative equity share dropped almost 10 percentage 
points between those two years.  This decline continued until equity shares reached a 
trough of 9% in 1974.  The end result of this collapse was that corporate equities and 
mutual funds, which were worth 3.9 trillion dollars in 1968, were only $1.1 trillion in 1974. 
  While stocks maintained this 10% share to 1983, thereafter there was a steady 
persistent climb back reaching a 17% share by 1994.  Then, the recent surge in equity 
prices increased the share of household wealth in equities to almost its mid-1960s levels.  
Note that the years of the sharpest drop in wealth/income ratios were years of a stock 
market collapse (1968-1974) while the years of the recent significant rise in wealth in 
proportion to income were years of a stock market boom (1983-1998).  If pension fund 
reserves as primarily equity-based and held on behalf of households and combined with 
pension reserves, the wealth share in this form was 33% in 1965 and almost half by 1998.    4
  While we have one strongly trended series (pension reserves) and one quite volatile 
one (stocks), the remarkable thing about housing equity is its relative long-run stability.  
The share of residential structures in balance sheet wealth was 17% in 1959 and 15% in 
1996.  Still, there were cycles that might matter especially in light of the high rate of 
housing ownership.  Housing equity rose during the housing boom of the 1970s.  While the 
recent decline in housing equity is mainly due to an expansion in mortgage lending, we will 
demonstrate below that there were key housing price cycles as well.   
1.2—Explanations for Macro-Trends-Asset Prices 
  These sharp shifts in relative shares hint at a role for real asset prices.  Two 
household assets with potentially volatile prices are housing and stock equity.  Fig. 3.b 
plots real prices of a median family home relative to 1980 while Fig. 3.a plots real stock 
prices relative to 1947 levels.  While some regional housing markets (such as California) 
were quite volatile, at a national level, there exists much less variation in real housing 
prices, especially when compared to the corporate equity market.  For example, there was 
about a 20% run up during the 1970s.  Subsequently, while there have been some modest 
bust and boom cycles, 1995 real housing prices were only slightly below the 1979 peak.  
 In  contrast,3 real equity prices almost doubled between 1955 and 1968, lost virtually 
all of that gain by 1974, languished at this level until 1983, and then started a steady uphill 
climb until inflation adjusted prices had doubled again by 1994. Then, real equity prices 
more than doubled again in the last four years.  The end result is that since 1983 there has 
taken place a quadrupling of real prices in the American stock market.   
  The size of these price fluctuations in the equity market may have had important 
consequences for trends in aggregate household wealth as well as the distribution of wealth 
across households.  For example, the inflation-adjusted decline in total wealth as well as 
the collapse of the equity share in total household wealth in the early 1970's was coincident 
with the collapse in equity prices during those years.  Similarly, the steady post-1983 climb 
back in equity shares and the maintenance of wealth-income ratios in spite of falling 
savings rates took place alongside a sharply rising equity market over that period.  The 
magnitude of these capital gains can translate into considerable changes in total household 
wealth.  Even, a 20% equity share would imply a post-1983 80% increase in total household 
                                                       
3 Counter-balancing small price cycles in housing compared to those in equities is the much more widespread home 
ownership compared to stock ownership. However, with the increase in stock ownership, this is becoming less true. 
The result is that total household wealth has become much more volatile.   5
wealth. Since there exist considerable variation across households in the fraction of their 
wealth held in equities, households with large equity shares may have experienced 
impressive wealth gains especially in recent years while those with little or no involvement 
in corporate equity were left behind.  
1.3—Explanations for Macro-Trends--Age and Marriage 
  Before dealing with the role of capital gains on household savings, we discuss two 
demographic forces that may have influenced trends in household assets and income-age 
distributions and rates of family formation.  Since both household wealth and income have 
distinctive age-gradients, wealth and wealth-income ratios may be sensitive to shifts in the 
age distribution.  For example, wealth at age 50 is about twice as high as population wealth 
and about 10 times higher than wealth of those household heads under age 35.  Because the 
wealth-age gradient is much steeper than the income-age gradient, wealth-income ratios 
are also influenced by age composition. 
  Shifts in the population age distributions over this period are largely a product of the 
relative size of the baby-boom and baby-bust cohorts.4  The third column of Table 1 adjusts 
the net worth minus pension series by normalizing it to the 1989 age distribution while the 
final column performs a similar adjustment for wealth-income ratios.  Relative to 1989, the 
American population was older in 1960, and thus age adjusted net worth would have grown 
by 45% compared to a 36% real change in the unadjusted series between 1960 and 1989.  
Compared to 1989, the population was also older in 1998, so that age adjustments also 
lowered 1998 net-worth per household.  Yet, while age trends did impact aggregate trends 
in household wealth, they do not offer an explanation for either the collapse of 
wealth/income ratios in the early 1970s or the recent sharp increase in these ratios.5 
  The second demographic trend involves the steady decline in the fraction of all 
households who are married.  More than three in every four households were married in 
1955; by 1998 only 54% were.  Marriage affects wealth accumulation most directly by 
combining the separate assets of men and women into a single unit so that, on average, 
married households have twice the wealth of single households.  Moreover, there is some 
evidence that marriage may encourage additional household savings beyond the sum of 
what the two partners would have done individually (see Smith (1999)).  
                                                       
4 In addition to prior fertility, the age-distribution of household heads is sensitive to prevalence and age of marriage.  
5 Parker (1999) also concludes that shifting age structures did not produce the recent consumption boom. Parker did 
not examine the impact of either marital status or education distribution.   6
  Even without behavioral effects on savings, marriage can alter trends in asset 
accumulation per household.  With no behavioral effects, total population wide household 
wealth remains unchanged, but the number of households is altered.  Each marriage 
dissolution essentially adds one additional household to the population. If marriage rates 
were maintained at 1989 levels, there would have been 6 million more households in 1955, 
an increase of 13%.  Alternatively, total wealth per household would have grown 13% more 
between 1955 and 1989 if there had been no change in family structure.  
  This effect of marriage would be eliminated by per-capita measures, but that raises the 
conceptually difficult question of allocating household wealth among individuals. 
Alternatively, the third column of Table 2 provides measures of mean household wealth 
normalizing marriage rates at their 1989 values while the forth column adjusts for both 
changes in age and marriage rates.  The downward trend in marriage formation attenuated 
secular growth in mean household wealth by an even greater amount than the shifting age 
distribution did.  Combined, these two demographic adjustments do strongly influence 
wealth trends.  If marital formation and age distributions did not change, real household 
wealth would have increased by 55% between 1960 and 1989, 20% more than the increase 
over those years.  However, and most important, these two demographic trends do not 
explain the central issue in this paper—the post-1983 sharp increase in wealth/income 
ratios when savings rates were declining.6  
 
Section 2.1—Wealth Holdings and Transitions: 1962-1994: Data Sources 
  Aggregate data on wealth are inherently limited because they cannot speak to the 
underlying structure of wealth variation across households.  To examine such variation and 
to span as long a time period as possible, we utilize data from three micro surveys that 
share sufficiently similar design features so that they are approximately comparable. 
Combined these surveys enable us to examine both current birth cohorts and their 
counterparts 30 years earlier.  These data sources include the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID); the Consumer Debt Panel (CDP), and the Survey of Financial 
Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC).  These data sets have unique features that need to 
be carefully examined to insure comparability. 
   The PSID has gathered almost 30 years of extensive economic and demographic data 
                                                       
6 Changes in the number of households affects both income and wealth per capita proportionately so that, wealth-  7
on a nationally representative sample of approximately 5000 (original) families and 35,000 
individuals living in those families.  PSID wealth modules, included in the 1984, 1989, and 
1994 waves, measure net equity in homes and non-housing assets divided into seven 
categories:  other real estate, vehicles; farm or business ownership; stocks, mutual funds, 
investment trusts and stocks held in IRAs; checking, savings accounts, CD's, treasury bills, 
savings bonds and liquid assets in IRA's; bonds, trusts, life insurance and other assets; and 
other debts.  These wealth modules also include questions about purchases and sales so 
that in principal active and passive (capital gains) savings can be distinguished.  
  CDP was a study of 1,434 families conducted annually between 1967 and 1970 by 
the University of Michigan.  Individuals were questioned yearly about their previous year's 
income by source, their labor force status, family composition, and detailed components of 
the current value of their assets and liabilities.7  The CDP has some features that limit the 
kinds of comparisons that are possible.  For example, it does not have any households over 
the age of 60, and hence cannot be used to make comparisons of older populations between 
the 1960s and 1990s.  In addition, CDP does not include as a component of household 
wealth the market value of equity in the respondents' business or farm; rather it includes 
only that part of business equity represented by the value of actual physical property.8 
  The SFCC, a precursor to the series of Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF's), was 
based on a sample of 2,557 families whose wealth was measured as of Dec. 31 1962.  Assets 
and debts were grouped into six major wealth components—home equity, autos, business 
assets, liquid assets (checking and savings accounts and U.S. savings bonds) and 
investment assets (stocks and bonds) and assets held in personal trusts.  The SFCC results 
reported in this paper are taken from those published in Projector and Weiss (1966).9  
   While they differ in the details, the three surveys share much in common. All are 
based on nationally representative samples, collect data on similar components of wealth, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
income ratios are independent of our marriage adjustments.   
7 See Smith and Ward (1980) for a detailed description of the CDP. The1967 wave only asked households to report 
the value of their assets within pre-specified ranges. In the 1968 and 1969 versions, respondents were asked exact 
values, but there were no special provisions for handling item non-response, which is widespread in household 
wealth surveys.  The 1970 data did not repeat questions on home and business value for non-buyers or sellers. 
Therefore,  only the 1968 and 1969 waves of the data allow estimation of household wealth. Since they are only a 
single year apart and quite similar, we report data from only the 1968 wave. 
8 CDP wealth includes net equity in home, net equity in cars, total installment and non-installment debt, and 
financial assets held in checking, savings, certificate of deposits, stocks and bonds minus the amount owed on 
stocks.  
9 As a result, Tables 2.a and 2.b have missing values for certain sub-groups.   8
and span most of the age distribution.  However, there are some differences10.  Since CDP 
only included households under age 60 and business equity was not asked in that survey, 
the data for all other surveys must be limited to ages 25-60 and the value of business equity 
is excluded from the other surveys.  Another difference is that the PSID introduced the use 
of unfolding bracket techniques to deal with non-response to wealth questions.  By limiting 
the range of the unknown wealth values, unfolding brackets have been shown to increase 
measures of mean wealth in surveys by about 10% (Juster-Smith (1997)).  We discuss the 
implication of this difference for survey comparability in the next section. 11  
2.2—The Structure of Wealth Holdings: 1962-1994 
  Tables 2.a and 2.b summarize changing structures of wealth and wealth-income 
ratios where households are stratified by the age, education, and marital status of the 
household head.12  Given the skew in wealth holdings, whenever possible, median and mean 
values of net worth are presented.  The first row of Table 2.a displays wealth trends across 
all families. To facilitate comparisons with FOF data, the second and third rows list mean 
wealth from household surveys as a percent of the FOF non-pension wealth from the same 
year.13  Numbers in the second row (1.a) cover the age groups 25-60 and exclude business 
equity while those in the third row (1.b) cover all age groups and include business equity.  
  Although wealth levels are lower in household surveys, the relatively constant ratios 
in rows 1(a) and 1(b) in Tables 2 (a) and 2 (b) indicate that mean wealth and wealth-income 
ratios in household surveys track secular trends in mean FOF wealth reasonably well.  
Mean household wealth, as a fraction of FOF wealth for our restricted age sample over 
these thirty-plus years is centered around 50%.14  There appears to be about a 10% upward 
                                                       
10 SFCC attempted to sample high income households, but that attempt is widely viewed as unsuccessful. For 
example, one a third on their high income sample participated in the survey and most did not answer the wealth 
questions.  Unlike the new SCFs, which come close to matching FOF measures of mean wealth, SFCC estimates are 
only half as high- similar to the range of surveys without high income over samples. 
11 One might wonder why we have not selected SCF surveys, which provide the most detailed measurement of 
household wealth.  Because wealth is known to be extremely positively skewed, SCF combined a representative 
area-probability sample with an over-sample of high income households obtained by a match with IRS records.  But 
our aim here is not to match in any given year with wealth levels contained in FOF data, but rather to insure that 
secular trends are not distorted by changing survey designs over time.  While SCF high income over-samples 
produce a much closer match with FOF data, they introduce serious issues of non-comparability with the other 
surveys.  Moreover, there are questions of non-comparability even within the set of SCF surveys.  Given the extreme 
skew in the upper tail of the wealth distribution, estimates of SCF mean wealth are very sensitive to the particular 
sample that happens to be chosen in any year.  As a result, time series trends using the SCF surveys do not match 
well wealth trends using FOF data (see Juster, Smith, and Stafford 1999).   
12 To preserve comparability with FOF data, these ratios are ratios of the averages.  
13 Since pensions are not in the household data, we use FOF measures excluding private pensions. 
14 There are three reasons why household wealth measures are roughly only half of the FOF measure.  The survey   9
shift in survey wealth as a percent of FOF wealth, consistent with estimates of the impact 
of unfolding brackets on mean wealth (Juster-Smith (1997)).  Still, the range of the percents 
in the second and third row do indicate that these household surveys provide a reasonable 
basis for detecting secular shifts, especially if the structural change is sufficiently large.15  
  Paralleling FOF wealth, household wealth increased across these thirty years while 
wealth/income ratios were falling.  The growth in mean household wealth exceeds that in 
median wealth indicating that (similar to income) wealth inequality was rising over these 
years.  In fact, growth in dispersion was greater in wealth than in income resulting in a 
larger growth in mean wealth-income ratios than in median wealth-income ratios. 
  Rows 4 through 6 of Tables 2 sequentially adjust trends in household wealth for 
secular changes in the age, marital status, and education distributions of these samples.  
All values are normalized to 1989.  Once again, fixing the age distribution at 1989 levels 
leads to a much larger secular increase in household wealth and smaller declines in 
wealth/income ratios.  Especially between 1968 and 1984, the declining fraction of married 
households was also an important force in slowing growth in mean levels of household 
wealth.  For example, mean household net worth in Table 2 would have grown by twice as 
much if the age and marital status distribution had remained unchanged.16 
  The final adjustment relates to schooling.  More educated households have larger 
wealth and higher savings rates than less educated households do so secular growth in 
schooling increases wealth levels.  A comparison of the fifth and sixth rows of Table 2.a 
indicates that increases in schooling accounts for a third of the age and marital status 
adjusted increase in wealth.  Yet, after adjusting for changing age, marital status and 
schooling distributions, the same question remains.  Since 1984 wealth levels were rising 
                                                                                                                                                                           
based data (1) do not over-sample the extremely wealthy; (2) do not include business equity; and (3) restrict age of 
the household head to less than 60, thereby excluding older households who are on average wealthier than others.   
15 To compare PSID to FOF more fully, the full PSID age sample should be used (row 1.b in Table 2.a and 2.b). 
This row shows that PSID net worth averaged about 72% of the FOF net worth without pensions indicating that 
about 40% of the PSID discrepancy with FOF wealth in row 1.a was due to the age restriction and elimination of 
business wealth. The remainder is due to the absence of a high income over-sample in the PSID. Juster, Smith and 
Stafford (1999) show that with the exception of wealthiest one percent of households, PSID wealth averages over 
90% of FOF. Using row 1.b, trends in wealth in the PSID and FOF are quite similar.  Both PSID and FOF measures 
show an increase in wealth between 1984 and 1989 followed by a decline between 1989 and 1994.  The absence of 
any decline in Table 2.a is apparently due to the age restriction in that table. The correspondence between wealth 
income ratios in the full PSID sample and FOF are even more exact (row 1.b in Table 2.b). 
16 The marital status adjustments in Table 2 are conceptually distinct from those in Table 1.  In Table 1, we assumed 
no behavioral effects only allowing marriage to alter the number of households.  Here, the adjustment asserts that 
the average married household would have the same wealth (and income) of the average non-married households if 
the marriage dissolved (no selection effects).  Thus, the adjustments in Tables 2 represent an upper bound estimate   10
alongside a rapidly falling private savings rate.  The resolution of this issue lies elsewhere. 
   Examining the changing structure of wealth across households may help point us 
toward an answer.  This changing structure is a tale of two gradients—age and education.  
Since within cell patterns are volatile, medians may be a better metric to describe trends. 
In 1968, median household wealth of those 55-60 years old was 4.2 times that of those 25-34 
years old; by 1994, the older households had 9.4 times as much wealth as did younger 
households.  A similar tilt in the age gradient took place with decreasing household wealth-
income ratios rates for younger households alongside increasing rates for older households.   
  At the same time, a similar shift was taking place in the wealth-schooling gradient. 
While median household wealth was actually falling among those with a high school degree 
or less, it was either rising or stable for those with a college degree.  In 1968, median 
wealth of college graduates was 2.8 times that of those who were not high school grads; by 
1994, this ratio had risen to 6.8 times.  For both older and more educated households, 
increases in wealth since 1984 appear to be larger when means are used in place of medians 
suggesting that wealth gains were unevenly distributed within these groups.  
  The changing age patterns of household wealth holdings over time make it natural 
to rearrange the data so that across and within cohort trends can be highlighted.  This is 
presented in Tables 3a and 3b which follow 10 year birth cohorts starting with those born 
in 1921-1930 and ending with those born between 1961 and 1970.17  Within cohorts, wealth 
has risen very rapidly with age, far more so than household income.  Moreover, this 
expansion in wealth with age is much greater among those who went to college and far 
steeper in mean than in median wealth. Indeed, mean wealth increments across the ten 
years between PSID wealth modules are so large that savings of these cohorts represent a 
quite unlikely explanation.  To illustrate for those who had attended college, mean wealth 
increased on average by about $25,000 per year for those 54-63 years old in 1984 and by 
about $10,000 per year among those 44-53 years old in 1984.  These households would have 
had to save up to a third of their income to produce these wealth increments which they 
clearly did not do.  In fact, their savings were actually falling between 1984 and 1994. 
   The data summarized in Tables 2 and 3 support the idea of a significant structural 
shift in household wealth accumulation—with lower wealth relative to income among the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of the effect of marriage. For an analysis of the savings promotion effects of marriage (see Smith (1999)).   
17 The positive correlation of wealth and mortality implies that aggregate consumption grows more rapidly  with age 
since higher consumption households are more likely to survive at older ages (Attanasio and Hoynes (1996))   11
young and the less schooled and corresponding higher wealth relative to income among 
older and more educated households.  A plausible explanation for the increasing tilt to the 
age and education wealth gradients rests on the potentially large role of capital gains in 
equity markets since 1983.  Capital gains impart benefits in proportion to past holdings.  
Older households have had more time to accumulate wealth and the better-educated as well 
as older households typically have a larger share of their portfolios in equity.  Thus, both 
groups had high exposure to capital gains or losses and the new structure of wealth 
holdings across households largely reflects the fact that this was an era of huge capital 
gains rather than capital losses.  The central question that remains concerns what impacts 
these large capital gains had on household saving behavior. 
 
Section 3—Models of Active Saving 
  In this section, we present estimates of the impact of capital gains on household 
saving using the three PSID waves that include wealth modules.  How households respond 
to a positive unexpected capital gain depends on their expectations regarding future capital 
gains (Deaton 1992).  Although a structural examination of household saving would 
explicitly take household expectations into account, our results are more data descriptive.  
If there is no persistence to the shock, an unexpected change in the rate of capital gain 
provides a one-time wealth shock (an increase in non-human wealth) that does not alter the 
inter-temporal price of consumption or the discounted value of future labor income.  All else 
equal, this will lead to an increase in consumption and an equal fall in saving since 
unrealized capital gains are not included in what is traditional defined as total income. 
  If households believe instead that the capital gain came from a permanent increase 
in the rate of capital gains, the effects on consumption and hence savings are ambiguous 
since the expected rate of return is the inter-temporal price of consumption as well as the 
discount term for future labor income.  The extent to which the persistence is temporary 
will diminish the human wealth effect as well as the inter-temporal substitution effects so 
that the initial non-human wealth effect may still dominate for even temporary changes in 
the expected rate of capital gains.  
  The capital gains used to obtain the empirical results described below are clearly a 
combination of expected and unexpected gains in the housing and corporate equity markets.  
The effects of capital gains on savings depend also on whether we believe a martingale 
process governs corporate earnings or the interest rate.  If the former, the saving response   12
of households to capital gains in stocks should largely reflect the non-human wealth effect 
as a result of a wealth shock.18  If the latter, the impact of an inter-temporal price change 
must also be considered.19 
    Household saving can be measured in panel surveys as the between wave 
differences in household wealth, adjusted for any capital gains or losses and net transfers 
into the household.  Such adjustments are necessary as there are wealth increments when 
individuals originally outside the household join, and wealth decrements when some family 
members leave.  Similarly, a family may receive inheritances in the form of new assets, and 
money may be withdrawn from pensions and added to household wealth.  Finally, wealth 
increments due to capital appreciation must be distinguished from active saving. 
  These distinctions can all be empirically implemented in the PSID.  Based on a 
sample of PSID households with the same household head in 1984, 1989, and 1994, total 
changes in household wealth between 1984, 1989, and 1994 were computed.  Net wealth 
transfers into the household were defined as the sum of money taken out of pensions, the 
value of new inheritances received, and assets brought in by new family members minus 
any assets previous family members took with them when they left.  The PSID includes a 
short transaction module which asks the amount of money put into real estate or business, 
net transfers into stocks, bonds, and annuities, allowing one to separate so called active 
saving from wealth accumulation that is a consequence of capital gains.  Total capital gains 
are defined as the change in the total value of stocks, businesses, and real estate minus the 
                                                       
18 Households have more forecast ability of capital gains in housing since this asset is lumpier than a portfolio of 
stocks, which can be bought and sold with relative ease.  A household may be able to forecast upward or 
downward trends in their house value and adjust their saving accordingly. With the increased liquidity of housing 
wealth, it should not be surprising that an unexpected capital gain is quickly and easily converted into consumption 
if the household so desires. However, if some gains and losses in housing over the 1984 to 1994 period were 
expected, this could explain the statistically insignificant result for the effect of housing gains on saving in Table 6. 
19 To examine these issues, we estimated one-step ahead forecasts from 1984 to 1998 using an AR (1) model on the 
percent change in the S&P 500 Index of common stocks where the model is re-estimated each period using the data 
from 1955 to the most current information. Our results indicate that between 1984 and 1994 the total return on 
stocks was 93% while the expected return was 26%.  Over the longer period 1984 to 1998, the total stock return was 
322% while the expected return was 55%.  In either case, this model suggests that a significant part of the recent 
stock market return was not anticipated. These equity price increases were also not a result of a switch in corporate 
policy from dividends to retained earnings. Our examination of equity price trends indicates that the 1.4% fall in 
dividend yield between 1984 and 1994 was a result of rising stock prices not of changes in dividends. Our model 
also predicts a slight rise of 1.5% in the expected yearly return from 1984 to 1994. 
The important caveat to this analysis concerns what the appropriate past time span is over which 
households make such forecasts. A longer horizon than 1955 would increase the expected return while a shorter 
horizon than 1955 would decease it. In the end, we must rely less formally on the uniqueness of the magnitude of the 
post 1983 equity price surge to argue that a significant part of the return was probably not expected.  Moreover with 
only two periods of active savings and capital gains in the PSID data, modeling these expectations within the PSID   13
net amount a household puts into these assets between waves.  This data provide two 
observations of active saving and capital gains for each household, i.e. from 1984 to 1989 
and from 1989 to 1994.  
  Table 4 lists mean changes between 1984 and 1994 in total net worth, active and 
passive saving, and net transfers.  Over this period, the mean change in total household 
wealth was $50,800 with capital gains representing 17% of that wealth increase.  
Mimicking conventional findings in the literature, wealth accumulation is concentrated in 
middle aged households and among the more educated especially college graduates.  
Moreover, as a proportion of wealth increments, capital gains are quantitatively more 
important among middle age households (one-third of wealth change for those 55-64 years 
old and among college graduates (about one-fourth). 
  Wealth transfers into and out of the household are not trivial.  Between these ten 
years, there was a net wealth transfer into the household of $8,600, approximately 17% of 
the total change in household wealth.  This component of wealth change represents neither 
active saving nor capital gains.  While these net transfers are an important part of total 
wealth change, unfortunately it is not possible in the PSID to know which part of net 
transfers appears as active and which part appears as passive saving.  To deal with this 
problem, we include in our model measures of these between wave net transfers.  
  To demonstrate the importance of net transfers and passive savings, the fifth 
column of Table 4 lists household wealth change minus net wealth transfers into the 
household. In this table, the largest number in each column is placed within an oval.  
Instead of peaking in the age 45-54 age group, the peak in household wealth changes now 
occurs among those 35-44 years old.  The final column in Table 4 presents an adjusted 
active savings series computed by assuming equal proportionate effects of net transfers on 
active and passive savings.  The peak in active savings now is among those 25-34 years old. 
The life-cycle curvature of household savings behavior is critical in testing alternative 
economic savings models.  That curvature is clearly sensitive to adjustments for net 
transfers and capital gains.   
  Table 5.A highlights a possible relation between household active saving and capital 
gains in stocks by arraying within sub-period values across the same demographic variables 
(indexed by 1984 values) used earlier.  A number of patterns are suggestive of a possible 
                                                                                                                                                                           
data is not yet feasible.    14
connection between the two.  For example, stock capital gains were larger (and active 
saving lower) between 1989-1994 than between 1984 and 1989.  Similarly, capital gains 
were concentrated among those 45–64 years old in part as they had a longer time to 
accumulated stocks by 1984 and typically hold a larger share of equity in their portfolio 
relative to other age groups.20  But these are the same age groups that experienced the 
largest across period drop in active saving.21  Finally, by far the largest increase in capital 
gains were among college grads- who simultaneously reduced their active saving by a third. 
  The data listed in Table 5.b derived from the Health and Retirement Survey, 
representing households in their fifties also indicates a possible effect of capital gains on 
active savings.  In this table, we have divided these similarly aged households in household 
income deciles.  Not surprisingly, households in the highest two income deciles received the 
largest capital gains.  But these are the same households who on average reduced their 
active savings the most. 
  While these results are suggestive, multivariate modeling is necessary to isolate this 
relationship.  There are several key statistical issues that must be addressed in such 
modeling.  First, it is well known that there exists considerable heterogeneity in saving 
behavior among what appear to be observationally equivalent households (see Venti-Wise 
(1999)).  Some households even with the same lifetime income are savers while others are 
not.  Such heterogeneity implies a strong positive association across households between 
active and passive saving.  Households who are active savers every year will have 
accumulated considerable wealth, thereby increasing their exposure to the possibility of 
capital gains and losses.  Thus, across-household estimates of the relation between active 
and passive saving would not be informative about the consequences of capital gains on 
saving for an individual household.  Our estimates are based instead on within-household 
changes in active saving.  These changes are measured as the difference in active saving 
between the 3rd and 2nd PSID wealth module (1994 and 1989) compared to active saving 
between the 2nd and 1st PSID wealth module (1989 and 1984).  All models are estimated 
                                                       
20 For an empirical description of portfolio composition over the life-cycle using the Survey of Consumer Finances 
see Poterba and Samwick (1997). 
21 This result is consistent with recent findings of Attanasio (1998) who reports that the decline in aggregate savings 
was concentrated on birth cohorts who were in their forties and fifties during the 1980s. Because of their age, capital 
gains would have been concentrated in these cohorts. Attanasio does not offer an explanation for this concentration. 
He tests and rejects a capital gains effect using a dummy variable for positive interest income.     15
using a sample of PSID households who were members of the survey in all three waves.22 
  Another set of issues stems from measurement error in household wealth, active 
savings, and capital gains.  In particular, there is the possibility of an artificially induced 
negative correlation between capital gains and active savings due to measurement error 
alone.  Household wealth is measured with considerable error, and the same is certainly 
true of active savings.  If active savings are measured with error, then given a change in 
wealth, a positive error in active savings will necessarily lower measured capital gains by 
an equal amount, biasing any estimate of the capital gains effect toward finding a more 
negative effect.  
  To formalize our model, we have a panel of households for the years 1984, 1989 and 
1994 which provides us with two periods of savings and capital gains (1984 to 1989 and 
1989 to 1994).  For simplicity, assume we only have two assets that sum to total household 
wealth. In the second and third wave, we obtain active saving information over the previous 
period in each asset.  We allow all wealth variables to be measured with error.  First, 
consider estimating the effect of total capital gains on total active saving.  The model we 
have in mind is: 
    ) ( ~
*
1 0 θ η η α β β β F X G S it i it it it + + + + ≈    (1) 
where  it X  is a vector of household characteristics which includes such things as permanent 
income as well as other demographics and  i α  is an unobservable household fixed effect, i.e. 
some households my be ‘savers’ while others may not.  It is likely that this household 
specific fixed effect is also correlated with other household characteristics and more 
importantly with capital gains, 
*
it G .  This problem is dealt with below. 
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where 
*
t S  and 
*
t W  are the true values of active saving and total wealth and  t ε  and  t µ  are 
                                                       
22 Another perennial problem stems from the non-significant measurement error in household wealth (see Juster-
Smith (1997)). To eliminate gross outliers from the sample, we trimmed the top and bottom distributions of each 
component of saving and capital gains by excluding the top and bottom 50 cases. Our final sample consisted of 
3008 households. The main result from our analysis, the magnitude of the impact of capital gains on active saving, 
is not sensitive to alternative trims.   16
measurement errors with variances 
12 0 1 2
222 22 [,, ,, ] εεµµµ σσσσσ .23  We allow for some households to 
consistently misreport their household saving and wealth leading to a non-zero mean total 
error, 
S φ  and 
W φ  respectively. 
Capital gains are defined as  
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  Our goal is to estimate the effect of 
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1 ttt t GWW S − ≡− −  on 
*
t S . The problem that could 
bias our results is that capital gains are measured with error and in particular, that one 
component of error moves one-for-one with the error in active saving. Also, note that while 
the fixed mis-reporting error is eliminated from wealth, it remains for now in the saving 
errors.  To control for the fixed behavioral effect of saving which may be correlated with 
capital gains, as well as the fixed mis-reporting error of saving, we examine only within 
household variation-the relationship between how the saving of each household responds, 
or changes, to the change in their own capital gains. We thus define: 
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where 
**
2121 SS S S S ≡−=−   and 
** ** *
21 02 1 (2 ) ( ) GW WW SS ≡−+− −  .  Although we wish to estimate the 
effect of G   on S  , the two are measured with error since we only observe  G ∆  and  S ∆ . Consider the 
following regression suppressing for expositional simplicity variation in X: 
  SG βη ∆=∆+ ∆. (5) 
The best linear unbiased estimate of β  with no measurement error would be given by 
 
1 * ˆ Cov , V SG G β
−
   =   
   (6) 
However, our estimate will be given by 
  [ ] [ ]
1 ˆ Cov , V SG G β
−
=∆ ∆∆  (7) 
Substituting back in the actual error term variances24, we get 
                                                       
23 All errors are assumed to be independent from each other. While this assumption is not necessary, it greatly 
simplifies the stylized exposition of the measurement error effect on our estimates. However, a similar but not 
identical assumption will be used to eliminate the mechanical bias introduced by the error in active saving. More is 
said to this point below. 
24 Our estimate of β  is   17
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There are two effects of measurement error.  The first term is the standard attenuation 
bias as a result of classical measurement error (the first term factor ratio on 
* ˆ β  is less than 
one). More unique to the current estimation problem is the second term. Since this term is 
positive, the effect will be make our estimate more negative. This error flows solely from 
measurement error in active saving and the definition of capital gains above.  If there were 
no measurement error in active saving, we would only be left with the classical error.25  In 
general, the two sources of bias operate in opposite directions, and it is not possible a prior 
to determine the direction of the overall bias. 
While eliminating the effects of the attenuation bias in (8) is quite difficult (finding 
proper instruments seems to be somewhat allusive in our view), we can eliminate the 
second source of bias which is a more critical problem in our application as it biases 
towards a larger negative effect.  Our method utilizes the availability of active saving and 
capital gains in multiple assets.  A closer look at the analysis above indicates that this bias 
is a result of the covariance in 
21
22 Cov[ , ] ( ) εε υϖ σ σ =− + , which stems from the relationship 
between defined capital gains and active saving.  The solution is to eliminate this 
covariance by eliminating from active saving the assets whose capital gains in which we are 
most interested, namely publicly held corporate equities. 
Consider the model introduced above in which we have two assets.  Now, we make 
explicit the fact that saving and capital gains are sums across these two assets.  We observe 
the saving and level amounts of these two assets for each household: 
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The qualitative effect of measurement error upon  ˆ β  is the same as the analysis in the text, i.e. there is a standard 
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where both are measured with error. Along with the fixed mis-reporting errors, 
k S φ  and 
k W φ , we assume that  kt ε  and  kt µ  are all mean zero with variances 
2
kt ε σ  and 
2
kt µ σ . In addition 
to temporal independence we also assume that the errors across assets are independent. 
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1 kt kt kt kt GAA S − ≡− −. The previous goal above was to estimate the effect of total capital 
gains, 
**
tk t GG =∑ , on total saving, 
**
tk t SS =∑ . We now attempt to determine the effect of 
capital gains in asset 2 on saving in asset 1 only. More will be said to the implications of 
this methodology below. Still controlling for the fixed effects in our saving equation, we 
examine first differences but only for saving in asset 1 and capital gains in asset 2: 
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 The key difference between (11) and (4) the covariance in (11) is zero by the measurement error 
independence assumption between assets in a given time period. 
We now consider the stylized example of regressing  1 S ∆  on  2 G ∆ . Given the result 
from (14), the covariance between the two variables reduces to  12 1 2 Cov[ , ] Cov[ , ] SG S G ∆∆ = . 
Our estimate of the effect of   2 G ∆  on  1 S ∆  then reduces to26 
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The mechanical bias no longer exists and we are left only with the attenuation bias. 
Since our focus is on the effect of capital gains in publicly help corporate equities on 
saving in the U.S., we eliminate the mechanical bias of our estimate introduced by 
measurement error by estimating the effect of capital gains on saving in assets other than 
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equities. The result will be biased as a result of the still present classical measurement 
error, but will be biased toward zero and thus toward finding no effect.  
Relying on this methodology, Table 6 lists our estimates of the effect of capital gains 
on active savings.  In addition to capital gains variables, our models include variables 
indexing the age of household head entered as a quadratic, a set of dummy variables 
capturing marital transitions between the three PSID waves, net transfers into the 
household, and changes in average household income. The marital transitions are indexed 
in this table by a three-letter sequence where M indicates married and N denotes not 
married. To illustrate, the first transition listed - MMN- represents a household that was 
married in 1984, married in 1989 and then divorced or separated by 1994.  Because of the 
significant amount of net transfers, two variables are included measuring the between 
wave amount of inheritances received and the amount of all net transfers into the 
household.  In this form, the inheritance variable measures the difference between the 
receipt of a dollar of inheritance and a dollar of wealth from a change in family membership 
or from pensions.  
  There is evidence of a strong quadratic in age, consistent with many other studies. 
Entry into marriage implies increases in household wealth while an exit from marriage 
signals a between wave decrease.  In the first difference formulation used here, second 
period marriage entries relative to either a first period marriage exit or marriage stability 
should lead to increase wealth accumulation. Similarly, second period marriage exits or 
marriage stability relative to a first period marriage entry should be associated with a 
decrease in wealth accumulation. These expectations are generally supported by the results 
presented in Table 6. For example, those households who got remained married between 
1984 and 1989 but were then divorced or separated by 1994 (MMN) experienced about 
$20,000 less wealth growth between 1994 and 1989 as they did between 1989 and 1984. 
Similarly, those households who divorced over the first period and then remained 
unmarried in the second period (MNN) had almost $20,000 more wealth in the later period. 
Finally, the change in savings of continuously married households was less than that of 
continuously not married households indicating that differences in savings rates of these 
types of households converged.  
  A between wave receipt of inheritance leads to a less than dollar for dollar increase 
in household wealth.  We estimate that for every dollar of inheritance computed levels of 
active saving rise by forty-six cents suggesting that the household may have consumed part   20
of the inheritance.27 Other net infusions of funds from either new family members joining or 
pension roll-overs do not appear to appreciably increase active savings in part because 
these sources of net additions to household wealth are relatively small and in part since 
they may be improperly assigned to passive saving.  For example, money withdrawn from a 
firm pension, which is then rolled-over into an IRA or Keogh account, would appear as 
capital appreciation. Since there is no real change in wealth of the household (just a 
reallocation of assets), household consumption and active saving should not change.  
  Our principal interest centers on the estimated impact of capital gains on active 
saving. The first model listed in Table 6, which combines all sources of capital gains into a 
single aggregate, indicates a quite small effect of a few cents per dollar.  However, this 
substantially understates the impact of capital gains on saving since the source of capital 
gains appears to matter a great deal (see Peek (1983)).  In the second column in Table 6, we 
present estimates which separate capital gains into those associated with housing, stock, 
and everything else (business and real estate). In this formulation, a dollar of capital gains 
in stocks reduces active saving by about seventeen cents. In contrast, the negative effect of 
capital gains in housing is much smaller (roughly three cents) and not statistically 
significant while the impact of capital gains in other tangible assets is essentially zero. 28  
  This estimate of the effect of capital gains in stock on active savings still contains 
the negative correlated bias introduced by negatively correlated measurement error in 
active savings and capital gains. Following the intuition from the statistical model above, 
this bias is eliminated in the third column by redefining active savings to exclude active 
savings in stocks. Clearly, our original estimates of the capital gains effect have only been 
trivially reduced (from -.1711 to -.1655) by this bias.  In retrospect, this is not surprising 
since active savings in stocks are only a small part of total active savings (and that is the 
only component that has this negatively correlated bias). 29  Having eliminated the impact 
                                                       
27 Measurement error in inheritances would lead to estimated coefficients below unity through the standard 
attenuation effect. 
28 Estimates in the literature vary on the impact of capital gains in housing.  Skinner (1989) finds a small negative 
effect of capital gains in housing on savings while Hoynes and McFadden (1994) report a small increase using the 
same data (PSID).  Examining only non-movers, Englehardt (1995) reports a negative effect of about 14 cents. He 
does not take into account capital gains in stocks.  
29 One possibility that we explored was whether only a few wealthy households were determining our regression 
coefficients. To answer that question, we re-estimated our model deleting sequentially the wealthiest 5, 10, and 25 
cases in each 1984 and 1989. Our new estimated effect of stock capital gains were -.167 (5 deletions). -.169 (10 
deletions), and -.156 (25 deletions). None of these deletions had any meaningful impact on the estimated effect of 
capital gains in stocks on active savings.   21
of savings heterogeneity and persistent measurement error, only classical measurement 
remains which will tend to bias our estimates toward finding no effect of stock market 
wealth. 30 
  Why would the impact of these alternative sources of capital gains be so different? 
While the larger effect of corporate equity is consistent with this asset being more liquid, 
the size of the effect for capital gains in housing may seem surprisingly small, especially in 
light of the rising popularity of home equity loans. Yet, this growing use of home equity 
financing represents more of a structural shift in the financing market than a reaction to 
rising or falling house values.31 For example, home mortgages in the PSID increased as 
much in the 1989--1994 years as during the 1984-1989 years even though the value of 
homes were falling between 1989-1994 and rising between 1984-1989.  Given this 
structural shift toward more use of home equity loans for re-financing, one would need 
more than the two periods available in the PSID to measure its impact.  In addition, unlike 
corporate equity, many individuals are on both sides of the housing market simultaneously 
so that housing price increases may be seen as a mixed blessing.  Younger households who 
own their own homes may still see rising housing prices as a problem if they desire to 
upgrade their homes in the future as their families grow. 
  Another explanation for a larger capital gain effect on saving may have to do with 
the lack of information on capital gains in pensions in the PSID data.  Some of those with 
large capital gains in privately held stocks were probably also enjoying large gains in their 
firm controlled plans, which were growing in popularity over this period (Venti- Wise 
(1999)).  The positive correlation of capital gains between private and firm accounts implies 
that our estimates overstate the savings adjustments to household equity accounts alone. 
While our ability to do much about this issue is constrained by limited PSID pension 
information, the forth column in Table 6 lists results from a model which adds a variable 
interacting capital gains in the stock market with the existence of a private pension for at 
least one spouse. Since those with a pension should have had larger total capital gains in 
stocks from all sources, our expectation is that the interaction term should be negative. The 
impact of capital gains in stocks is indeed statistically significant for both those with and 
without pensions, but is more than twice as large for those respondents with a pension. 
                                                       
30 As is well known, this issue of the direction of bias due to random measurement is more complicated and depends 
on the existence of measurement error in other co-variates as well as the possible non-independence of measurement 
error from true values. See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2000) for an excellent discussion.    22
This difference in the size of ‘wealth’ effects among those with and without pensions does 
not suggest that these two types of households react differently to a given wealth increase. 
Rather it may only indicate that the true size of the wealth increase is larger among 
households with a pension.  
  Table 7 supplements the results contained in Table 6 by separating total active 
savings into financial and non-financial savings.  The first column under financial includes 
all types of active savings including those in stock in the financial category while the second 
column excludes active savings in stock for the same measurement error reasons discussed 
above.  Once again, the negatively correlated measurement error bias turns out to be quite 
small. Most important, the wealth effect from appreciation in corporate equity appears to 
be divided roughly equally between financial and non-financial saving. 
  Can our estimated effects of capital gains account for the decline in U.S. saving 
rates documented above? To answer this question, we used our estimates to predict NIPA 
saving rates allowing for year by year changes in mean household income and capital gains 
in stocks and housing.32  Between 1984 and 1994, the two five year periods spanned by the 
PSID wealth modules were characterized by a housing market boom followed by a housing 
market bust producing roughly offsetting capital gains and losses in housing. In constant 
dollars, PSID household’s achieved capital gains in stocks during both periods so that 
during these ten years, the equity market dominated any effect on active saving. In 
contrast, the years 1994 to 1998 were one of dual increases in capital gains in both housing 
and stocks, suggesting that the impact of capital gains on saving should have accelerated.33 
  Table 8 indicates that capital gains, especially those in corporate equity, can 
account for the decline in U.S. saving.  Between 1984 and 1998, NIPA saving rates fell from 
8.1% to 1.8%. Our model predicts a decline to 1.2%, a remarkably close match34. Our model 
                                                                                                                                                                           
31 Parker (1999) also concludes that financial innovation was unlikely to have caused the recent consumption boom. 
32 Fig 1 shows that there is considerable year by year variability in NIPA saving rates. Since our model has little to 
say about these year by year fluctuations, we used three year moving averages for the actual and predicted rates. 
33 Housing capital gains between 1994 and 1998 were estimated as the product of the mean real housing value in the 
1994 PSID and the real percent change in the U.S. housing price index between 1994 and 1998. Stock capital gains 
between 1994 and 1998 were computed by multiplying the mean 1994 PSID stock value by the percent increase in 
the Standard and Poor’s index of common stocks. 
34 Parker (1999), who also used PSID data, investigated the flip side of the same issue by examining the impact of 
the ‘wealth effect’ on consumption.  Parker concluded that at most the ‘wealth effect’ could explain only one-fifth of 
the recent consumption boom. He also finds that the change in consumption  appears to be similar for people at 
different levels of wealth which he concludes is inconsistent with a strong wealth effect.  
There is in fact no inconsistency at all between Parker’s results and ours.  In his work, Parker only estimates a single 
wealth effect across all assets. If we take our estimate of a single wealth effect that does not distinguish different   23
does less well on the exact timing of change, under predicting the fall between 1984 and 
1994 and over predicting the subsequent rise between 1994 and 1998. 
  Is the magnitude of our estimate of the impact of capital gains in stocks reasonable?  
Some have argued that if the planning horizon is the expected end of life, consumption from 
this wealth increase should be allocated over the remaining years implying a relatively 
small savings effect from capital gains (Starr-McCluer (1998)).  But going back to 
Friedman’s original work (1957), there is a body of research suggesting that planning 
horizons are considerably shorter than that.  For one thing, retirement is not the only 
motive for savings. For other motives such as savings for college expenses for children, 
horizons are considerably shorter so that impacts of capital gains on active savings may be 
much larger.  In addition, buffer-stock savers (who implicitly behave as if they have a very 
short time horizon) consume a much larger fraction of a wealth shock than the text book 
life-cycle saver models (Carroll (1997)).35   
  Moreover, these savings responses to capital gains using the PSID should be higher 
than those based on macro-models for several reasons. First, stock ownership is much more 
widespread today than during the years covered by the early macro-studies of the 1960s 
and 1970s or for that matter for many years used in current generation macro-models. 
Second, the PSID excludes the super-wealthy whose ability to further increase their 
consumption may be quite limited. The consumption and savings behavior of such wealthy 
individuals are part of the FOF time series data.  These super-wealthy individuals will 
lower the average negative response of savings to capital gains.  
  Moreover, due to the sequencing of PSID wealth modules, we are estimating effects 
of capital gains in corporate equity spaced five years apart. While this restriction was 
survey induced, it may inadvertently bring with it an analytical advantage.  Given the 
extreme variability in stock prices, consumption smoothing households will not want to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
types of assets (the first column in our Table 6), we also find a small wealth effect. In fact, our undifferentiated 
wealth effect is slightly smaller than that of Parker in that it would explain only one-sixth of the decline in savings. 
It is only when one differentiates different types of assets, and in particular capital gains in corporate equity, that one 
finds a wealth effect strong enough to explain the savings decline.   
Similarly, his conclusions about the distribution of the consumption increases across wealth levels raise the 
same issue. His conclusions are based on a comparison across total wealth (actually its ln), but the real issue 
involves changes across capital gains in corporate equity.  There is very little relation between cross-sectional wealth 
levels and capital gains in corporate equity in the PSID.  For example, the simple correlation between total 
household wealth and total stock wealth in the 1984 PSID is only .4.  More relevant to the issue at hand, the 
correlation between 1984 wealth (essentially the Parker variable) and subsequent capital gains in stocks (our 
measure) is only .12. 
35 Carroll (1997) provides simulations that yield and average MPC  ranging from .16 to .49.    24
vary their consumption to react to daily, monthly, or even yearly equity price variation 
(Bhatia (1972)).  Significant short-run price variability may be taken as evidence of high 
price variability (uncertainty) to which prudent households may well react with 
understandable caution in adjusting their consumption. Some changes in consumption such 
as durable goods may have to meet threshold requirements before changes take place.  
Similarly, habit consumption models also imply larger long run than short-run responses to 
wealth changes.  If individuals wait before deciding to adjust their consumption to a shock, 
the period response to a capital gain shock may be small, but the five year effect we are 
estimating larger.36  Finally, the sustained stock market boom of this period may have 
induced some individuals to revise upward their estimates of the rate of return on stocks, 
which, if wealth effects dominate, could increase their consumption, further. 
 
Conclusions 
  This paper reached several conclusions.  Most important, the rapidly declining rates 
of household savings since 1983 appear largely to be a consequence of the large amounts of 
capital gains achieved in corporate equity markets.  Wealth effects are larger when they 
occur and persist in the stock market than they are in other assets.  Moreover, a failure to 
differentiate wealth effects across asset types results in a significant understatement of the 
magnitude of their impact. The recent large increases in stock equities as a share of 
household wealth also imply that household wealth has become more volatile. This 
volatility may have implications for business cycles since persistent swings in the stock 
market may now have a larger impact on consumer behavior.  
  The changing age and family formation distributions of the American population did 
act to significantly reduce aggregate household wealth while rising education levels 
increased it.  Yet, the recent trend of increasing household wealth in the face of historically 
low saving rates is not basically demographic in origin, but seems to be best explained by 
noting the tremendous capital gains over the past two decades. 
  Capital gains, especially in equity shares, helped to preserve wealth levels in recent 
years in spite of the collapse of household savings rates.  However, wealth benefits from 
capital gains have been far from uniform.  There have been two key structural changes in 
                                                       
36 Consequently, micro and macro- models that include savings (or consumption) responses to these shorter-run 
price will estimate smaller coefficients than the longer run responses estimated here While there is considerable 
variation across studies, estimates from macro-models appear to be somewhat smaller than those reported here   25
wealth-income ratios.  The already steep age-wealth gradient has become much steeper as 
wealth levels fell for the young and rose for the more mature.  Similarly, wealth/income 
ratios declined for the less educated, but rose among those with more schooling.  While 
rising rates of capital gains can offer an explanation for rising wealth levels of the more 
educated, it has little to say about falling wealth levels of the less educated. An explanation 
for falling wealth levels for those with little schooling must lie elsewhere (see Hubbard, 
Skinner, and Zeldes (1995)) for an explanation for low educated households).  
  Additional tests of the impact of capital gains on savings would be desirable.  One 
fruitful avenue to pursue may be cross-national differences.  Countries differ significantly 
in the extent to which households participate in the corporate equity market as well as in 
the magnitude of local stock market fluctuations over time.  Since they also vary 
considerably in secular trends in national savings rates, the correspondence between 
country specific savings rates and stock market indexes may provide a powerful test.  In 
addition, a better reconciliation of recent trends in household savings and consumption 
would help increase our confidence on the appropriate role that should be assigned to 
wealth effects in explaining household behavior.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
(Starr-McCluer (1998)).   26
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Year Net Worth
















1960 166.2 157.8 143.6 141.3 128.6 4.50 4.27 4.10
1961 176.0 166.6 150.8 149.5 135.3 4.68 4.43 4.24
1962 175.0 165.3 151.0 148.5 135.6 4.53 4.28 4.08
1963 179.9 169.3 154.1 151.9 138.2 4.53 4.26 4.06
1964 188.3 176.7 160.8 158.9 144.6 4.55 4.27 4.06
1965 195.6 183.0 166.6 165.6 150.7 4.54 4.25 4.03
1966 192.8 180.0 163.8 163.1 148.4 4.29 4.01 3.79
1967 206.2 192.3 175.0 174.4 158.7 4.45 4.15 3.92
1968 217.0 202.4 184.6 184.2 168.0 4.55 4.24 4.00
1969 206.4 191.9 176.2 175.4 161.0 4.23 3.93 3.72
1970 202.7 187.8 173.5 171.9 158.8 4.12 3.82 3.62
1971 210.1 194.0 179.8 178.8 165.8 4.25 3.92 3.71
1972 225.7 207.7 195.0 192.3 180.6 4.42 4.07 3.87
1973 217.2 200.1 189.7 186.1 176.5 4.10 3.78 3.61
1974 193.6 178.0 170.7 166.4 159.6 3.75 3.45 3.32
1975 200.1 182.1 175.5 171.2 165.1 3.94 3.58 3.46
1976 208.1 189.1 183.2 179.0 173.4 4.01 3.64 3.52
1977 208.9 189.5 185.0 180.4 176.0 3.94 3.58 3.48
1978 214.5 193.8 190.9 186.5 183.7 3.94 3.56 3.49
1979 223.2 201.7 199.0 194.8 192.3 4.04 3.65 3.57
1980 221.2 198.7 198.9 192.9 193.1 4.15 3.73 3.69
1981 215.2 193.0 193.9 188.5 189.4 4.01 3.59 3.56
1982 215.7 190.5 191.3 186.6 187.3 4.06 3.59 3.56
1983 221.5 192.8 192.5 188.8 188.4 4.12 3.59 3.55
1984 225.4 195.3 195.7 192.1 192.5 3.99 3.46 3.44
1985 239.3 204.5 204.8 202.1 202.3 4.17 3.57 3.55
1986 251.3 214.3 215.4 212.2 213.3 4.34 3.70 3.70
1987 254.8 217.0 216.8 215.0 214.8 4.34 3.69 3.68
1988 262.6 223.3 223.1 222.5 222.2 4.40 3.74 3.73
1989 269.6 226.3 226.3 226.3 226.3 4.49 3.77 3.77
1990 260.7 216.5 215.2 216.6 215.3 4.30 3.57 3.55
1991 266.2 218.0 215.6 219.2 216.8 4.46 3.65 3.63
1992 265.4 215.3 210.4 217.1 212.1 4.40 3.57 3.52
1993 268.9 215.4 210.8 216.8 212.3 4.42 3.54 3.51
1994 267.5 213.2 207.4 215.0 209.2 4.32 3.44 3.40
1995 283.8 223.8 216.4 226.3 218.9 4.53 3.58 3.51
1996 299.8 233.9 228.0 237.4 231.5 4.65 3.63 3.54
1997 324.3 249.6 238.2 254.6 242.9 4.92 3.79 3.70
1998 349.4 266.1 251.2 271.6 256.4 5.16 3.93 3.83
* Net worth data has been adjusted for changes in the distribution of age.
** Household data has been adjusted for changes in the distribution of marital status.
*** Both net worth and income have been adjusted for changes in the distribution of age and marital status.
Mean Net Worth Measures Per Household
Table 1
FOF Measures of Household Wealth
(thousands of 1996 dollars)
   Source: Board of Govenors of the Federal Reserve, Balance Sheets for the U.S. Economy - Flow of Funds, C.9 and the National Income and 
Products Accounts.  29
 
     Median         Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
All families (1)            NA 83.8 43.3 100.4 43.5 107.8 38.5 116.3 41.2 118.8
    as % of FOF     50.7                49.6 55.2 51.4 55.7
All families (2)   69.4 90.8 107.8 116.3 116.9
All families (3)              NA 80.3 102.9 116.3 116.6
All families (4)            NA 88.4 110.7 116.3 113.7
Age
25-34 4.6 28.4 17.6 41.7 12.0 34.9 11.3 29.9 12.6 48.8
35-44 27.6 66.2 48.0 99.4 59.1 108.0 49.0 116.8 41.8 104.6
45-54 43.9 91.5 58.6 132.4 93.4 204.9 86.9 215.7 92.4 188.8
55-60 56.3 135.9 74.6 139.4 105.8 173.9 133.0 219.5 119.0 244.3
61+ 45.9 141.4           NA           NA 89.9 165.8 98.7 199.0 104.9 219.4
Education
No HS deg            NA            NA 27.1 74.9 23.3 53.1 13.7 55.6 12.5 57.4
HS deg            NA             NA 46.4 85.7 39.2 79.5 35.4 84.6 32.4 75.6
HS deg            NA            NA 55.2 117.8 42.5 104.6 38.5 106.1 45.9 112.8
College deg or more            NA            NA 75.8 152.1 82.6 202.6 73.2 211.6 85.1 208.5
Marital Status
Married            NA            NA 48.0 108.9 70.7 148.7 70.7 166.6 69.9 154.1
Not Married            NA            NA 19.6 59.3 10.2 41.7 10.7 48.4 12.5 64.8
(1) Unadjusted sample
(2) Adjusted to age distribution in 1989
(3) Adjusted to age and marital distribution in 1989
(4) Adjusted to age, marital and education distribution in 1989
Source: SFCC 1962; CDP 1968; PSID 1984, 1989, and 1994.
      Table 2.a
Household Net Worth 1962-1994
1962 1994 1968 1984 1989  30
 
 
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
All families (1) 2.30 1.15 2.32 0.98 2.02 0.85 2.10 0.90 2.02
All families (2) 1.98 2.12 2.01 2.10 2.02
All families (3) 2.10 1.98 2.10 2.04
All families (4) 2.22 2.06 2.10 2.00
Age
25-34 0.96 0.51 1.11 0.33 0.84 0.31 0.72 0.31 0.99
35-44 1.64 1.18 2.08 1.16 1.82 0.96 1.95 0.86 1.75
45-54                    1.51 2.87 1.75 3.23 1.61 3.08 1.70 2.84
55-60 4.00 2.21 3.44 2.22 2.94 2.92 3.74 2.79 3.59
 61+ 6.67                                     4.11 5.31 4.41 5.84 4.37 5.77
Education
No HS deg 0.90 2.32 0.84 1.53 0.48 1.64 0.46 1.72
HS deg 1.26 2.10 0.97 1.75 0.87 1.84 0.78 1.62
Some College 1.26 2.40 0.88 1.94 0.83 1.99 0.99 1.96
College deg or more 1.53 2.37 1.30 2.51 1.11 2.51 1.22 2.38
Marital Status
Married 1.18 2.34 1.26 2.26 1.22 2.37 1.17 2.07
Not Married 0.85 2.10 0.39 1.30 0.38 1.42 0.44 1.93
(1) Unadjusted full sample
(2) Adjusted to age distribution in 1989
(3) Adjusted to age and marital distribution in 1989
(4) Adjusted to age, marital and education distribution in 1989
Source: SFCC 1962; CDP 1968; PSID 1984, 1989, and 1994.
Household Net Worth/Income Ratios
Table 2.b




Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Birth Year of Head
(Age in parentheses)
1921-1930
   Full Sample 51.5 110.4 106.6 171.1 118.1 231.7 121.1 262.6
   High School or less 37.7 77.4 81.1 122.4 84.4 146.2 89.9 145.8
   Some College or more 81.9 159.5 192.4 296.5 224.6 436.9 310.1 543.7
1931-1940
   Full Sample 28.7 53.6 88.6 146.3 101.9 197.3 119.0 231.3
   High School or less 17.3 43.0 62.3 91.4 70.1 128.3 74.6 152.1
   Some College or more 38.7 64.1 132.8 239.1 156.4 296.4 203.6 337.4
1941-1950
   Full Sample 55.6 101.4 64.5 175.3 88.7 183.9
   High School or less 40.2 73.5 42.6 90.7 51.2 98.2
   Some College or more 74.6 128.5 96.8 241.6 120.1 246.1
1951-1960
   Full Sample 10.2 31.6 21.7 59.1 39.2 97.7
   High School or less 6.3 23.9 12.4 38.2 23.0 56.3
   Some College or more 14.7 41.9 30.4 80.1 65.1 138.8
1961-1970
   Full Sample 4.4 15.8 11.2 46.4
   High School or less 2.5 12.5 7.3 29.0
   Some College or more 8.4 20.5 14.8 64.0
Source: Consumer Debt Panel (1968) ; Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1984,1989,1994).
                          (19-28)                           (24-33)
(Thousands of 1996 Dollars)
Table 3.a
Household Wealth by Birth Cohort
                           (38-47)                           (54-63)
                         (34-43)                          (39-48)
                           (28-37)
                         (44-53)
                          (24-33)                          (29-38)                           (34-43)
                (44-53)                           (49-58)                          (54-63)
1968 1984 1989 1994
                           (59-68)                            (64-73)  32
 
 
Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
Birth Year of Head
(Age in parentheses)
1921-1930
   Full Sample 1.25 2.28 2.49 3.18 3.58 5.01 4.55 6.20
   High School or less 1.04 2.04 2.29 2.95 3.11 4.20 4.08 4.77
   Some College or more 1.64 2.49 3.16 3.50 4.58 5.95 7.21 7.65
1931-1940
   Full Sample 0.77 1.29 1.62 2.33 2.03 2.93 2.92 3.81
   High School or less 0.57 1.33 1.42 1.86 1.79 2.65 2.40 4.23
   Some College or more 0.86 1.27 1.94 2.80 2.26 3.13 3.18 3.60
1941-1950
   Full Sample 1.12 1.74 1.15 2.66 1.63 2.71
   High School or less 1.02 1.69 0.95 1.88 1.28 2.12
   Some College or more 1.20 1.78 1.46 3.03 1.73 2.96
1951-1960
   Full Sample 0.29 0.80 0.52 1.21 0.82 1.66
   High School or less 0.22 0.74 0.36 1.04 0.60 1.30
   Some College or more 0.35 0.85 0.59 1.33 1.09 1.86
1961-1970
   Full Sample 0.17 0.51 0.29 1.00
   High School or less 0.12 0.48 0.23 0.76
   Some College or more 0.26 0.54 0.32 1.18
Source: Consumer Debt Panel (1968) ; Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1984,1989,1994).
Table 3.b
                     (24-33)                       (19-28)
                    (34-43)                     (24-33)
                      (44-53)                      (28-37)
                    (64-73)                       (59-68)
Household Wealth/Income Ratio by Birth Cohort
(Thousands of 1996 Dollars)
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1968 1984 1989 1994
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Table 4 
Mean Family Saving from 1984-1994 






















Age of head (in 1984)         
Less  than  25    35.8    3.8   39.5   1.2 
25-34    55.5    3.7   59.2   6.0 
35-44   54.4   14.5    68.9    8.7 
45-54   58.4   12.4    70.7    20.1 
55-64   27.0   13.6    40.6    7.2 
65 or more    -0.3    1.3    1.0    6.2 
 
Education of head (in 1984) 
      
Less than high school degree    13.9    2.2    16.2    1.9 
High school degree    30.0    3.8    33.8    12.1 
Some  college    51.2    5.8   57.0   7.7 
College degree or more    90.5    27.2    117.7    11.5 
  Source: PSID 
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Table 5 
A. The Relation Between Active Saving and Stack Capital Gains 




  Active  Stock Gains Active Savings Stock Gains
Total   24.1      2.0 18.1 8.8 
Age    
less 25    17.7      0.0 14.1 -0.1 
25-34    26.6      0.8 25.8 3.3 
35-44    26.7      3.0 28.0 8.5 
45-54    38.9      6.5 27.7 14.4 
55-64    21.5      0.4 8.7 16.5 
65 or more    4.1       0.9 -1.3 4.2 
Education    
less HS    8.8      -1.1 6.5 3.3 
HS    17.4       1.4 9.0 5.8 
Some college    24.7       3.4 25.2 9.6 
College or more   53.9       5.9 39.2 19.3 
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Table 6 
Effects of Capital Gains on Active Saving 
(Fixed Effect Estimates) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  All Active Saving   All Active Saving—Active Savings in Stock 
 __________________________________  _______________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef.    t-stat 
Age  2,399 3.66 2,379 3.64  2,251  3.50  2,204  3.39 
Age2    -23.8  -3.82 -23.4  -3.76  -22.4 -3.67  -21.7 -3.51 
Marriage Transitions 
  MMN  -20,506  -4.40  -20,259  -4.36  -21,413 -4.67  -21,088 -4.52 
  MNM  7,024 0.90 7,170 0.92  7,173  0.93  6,937  0.90 
  NMM  -6,811  -1.27  -6,406  -1.20  -8,919 -0.93 -9,066 -1.72 
  NNM  14,618 2.00  15,074 2.07  12,542  1.75 13,738  1.88 
  NMN  -18,353  -2.23  -18,874  -2.30  -17,682 -2.19  -18,047 -2.20 
  MNN  18,884 3.45  19,433 3.55  17,930  3.34 18,033  3.33 
  MMM  -5,225  -2.63  -4,766  -2.40  -5,803 -2.97 -5,895 -2.99 
Net  Transfers  0.0255 2.25  0.0253 2.23  0.0272  2.44 0.0272  2.43 
Inheritances  0.4443 6.49  0.4606 6.72  0.4252  6.31 0.4310  6.36 
 Average Total Income  0.0815  1.77  0.0883  1.91  0.0715  1.58  0.0717  1.56 
 Capital Gains 
 All Capital Gains  -0.0265  -1.74 
 Cap Gains-Housing      -0.0281  -1.09  -0.0197  -0.77  -.0182  -.0.71 
  Cap  Gains-Stocks      -0.1711  -4.27  -0.1655 -4.20 -.1050 -2.24 
  Cap  Gains-Other      0.0194  0.85  0.0197 0.88 .0193 0.86 
 Pension* Cap Gains Stock              -.2041  -2.40 
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Table 7 
Effects of Capital Gains on Active Financial and Non-Financial Saving 
(Fixed Effect Estimates) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Financial  Saving— 
  Financial Saving  Stock Active Saving  Non-Financial Saving 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat 
 
Age  1,262 2.50  1,134 2.32  1,117 2.71 
Age2    -15.3 -3.19  -14.4 -2.05  -8.07 -2.05 
 
Marriage Transitions 
  MMN  -4,734 -1.32  -5,783 -1.67  -15,525 -5.30 
  MNM  1,696 0.28  1,699 0.29  5,474 1.11 
  NMM  -863 -0.21  -3,376 -0.84  -5,543 -1.64 
  NNM  7,080 1.26  4,547 0.84  7,994 1.74 
  NMN  -10,174 -1.60  -8,983 -1.47  -8,700 -1.68 
  MNN  8,114 1.92    6,610 1.62  11,319 3.28 
  MMM  -1,503 -0.98  -2,540 -1.72  -3,263 -2.60 
 
Net  Transfers  -0.0085 -0.97  -0.0065 -0.77  0.0337  4.72 
 
Inheritances  0.3017 5.70  0.2663    5.20  0.1589 3.67 
 
Average Total Income  0.1264  3.55  0.1096  3.18  -.0381  -1.31 
  
  Cap  Gains-Housing  0.0083 0.41  0.0167 0.84  -00364  -2.23 
  Cap  Gains-Stocks  -0.0855 -2.77  -0.0799 -2,67  -0.0856 -3.39 
 Cap Gains-Other  0.0319  1.81  0.0321  1.89  -0.0124  -0.87 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 






Model Predictions for Saving Rates 
   _________________________________________________________ 
     NIPA  Saving 
     Actual  Predicted 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
     1984  8.1  8.1 
     1989  5.1  6.2 
     1994  4.5  4.9 
     1998  1.8  1.2 




























































































































NIPA defined Personal Saving Rate (left scale)
Household Wealth to Disposable Income (right scale) 
Figure 2:
















































































Mutual Funds + Corporate Equities Pension Fund Reserves Home Equity
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1984 1989 1994
Median Mean Percent Median Mean Percent Median Mean Percent
All families (1) 47.0 138.5 100.0 47.2 159.8 100.0 50.6 157.0 100.0
As % of FOF   70.9 70.6 73.6
All families (2) 143.9 159.8 159.7
All families (3) 141.0 159.8 155.5
All families (4) 144.6 159.8 150.6
Age of head
Less then 25 2.9 17.6 8.7 2.4 11.0 6.5 4.9 25.9 6.3
25-34 12.9 40.4 25.7 12.4 43.5 24.1 13.8 60.6 23.4
35-44 63.0 161.6 18.7 52.1 137.8 22.7 45.9 124.3 25.2
45-54 103.6 246.6 13.1 91.0 311.4 12.9 99.7 227.9 17.7
55-64 111.1 204.3 14.4 138.3 284.7 13.4 146.2 278.3 10.3
65 or more 87.1 178.4 19.4 93.7 190.6 20.5 104.4 238.3 17.1
70 or more 77.8 164.4 14.2 93.1 191.6 14.6 90.8 182.1 11.6
Education of head
Less than high school degree 26.6 76.9 28.7 22.7 92.3 26.8 20.9 85.3 21.4
High school degree 43.8 105.7 35.1 43.6 112.7 32.0 41.8 106.0 32.3
Some college 51.8 133.4 16.2 49.0 167.5 20.1 56.9 151.4 20.7
College degree or more 101.9 295.3 19.5 98.0 309.9 21.0 105.4 293.0 24.5
Marital status of head
Married 84.8 201.7 55.1 94.3 243.5 52.6 86.7 216.6 56.4
Not married 12.8 61.1 44.9 14.8 66.9 47.4 16.4 79.9 43.5
(1) Unadjusted full sample.
(2) Adjusted to age distribution in 1989.
(3) Adjusted to age and marital distribution in 1989.
(4) Adjusted to age, marital and education distribution in 1989.
Appendix Table A




Median Mean Percent Median Mean Percent Median Mean Percent
All families (1) 1.30 3.03 100.0 1.28 3.34 100.0 1.30 3.00 100.0
As % of FOF 88.10 88.60 88.20
All families (2) 3.12 3.34 3.17
All families (3) 3.13 3.34 3.15
All families (4) 3.14 3.34 3.09
Age of head
Less then 25 0.13 0.70 8.7 0.12 0.48 6.5 0.22 1.02 6.3
2 5 - 3 4 0 . 3 50 . 9 82 5 . 70 . 3 41 . 0 52 4 . 10 . 3 41 . 2 32 3 . 4
3 5 - 4 4 1 . 2 42 . 7 21 8 . 71 . 0 22 . 3 12 2 . 70 . 9 52 . 0 82 5 . 2
4 5 - 5 4 1 . 9 43 . 8 91 3 . 11 . 6 94 . 4 41 2 . 91 . 8 43 . 4 31 7 . 7
5 5 - 6 4 2 . 6 93 . 9 41 4 . 43 . 2 94 . 8 91 3 . 43 . 8 54 . 7 01 0 . 3
6 5  o r  m o r e 4 . 5 46 . 1 81 9 . 44 . 8 26 . 9 42 0 . 54 . 9 56 . 7 21 7 . 1
7 0  o r  m o r e 4 . 5 56 . 1 81 4 . 25 . 7 57 . 3 41 4 . 65 . 4 76 . 2 81 1 . 6
Education of head
Less than high school degree 1.32 2.77 28.7 1.14 3.38 26.8 1.01 3.12 21.4
High school degree 1.24 2.59 35.1 1.29 2.80 32.0 1.18 2.51 32.3
S o m e  c o l l e g e 1 . 1 92 . 6 91 6 . 21 . 1 63 . 2 62 0 . 11 . 3 12 . 7 72 0 . 7
College degree or more 1.70 3.85 19.5 1.56 3.82 21.0 1.59 3.45 24.5
Marital status of head
M a r r i e d 1 . 6 93 . 3 75 5 . 11 . 8 13 . 7 85 2 . 61 . 6 03 . 1 45 6 . 4
N o t  m a r r i e d 0 . 6 12 . 2 44 4 . 90 . 6 82 . 3 44 7 . 40 . 7 12 . 6 94 3 . 5
(1) Unadjusted full sample.
(2) Adjusted to age distribution in 1989.
(3) Adjusted to age and marital distribution in 1989.
(4) Adjusted to age, marital and education distribution in 1989.
Appendix Table B
Net Worth/Income Ratio:  Full PSID Sample